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THE NEW METHOD OF REGULATING LAWYERS:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTEREST SANCTIONS
DURING CIVIL LITIGATION FOR ATTORNEY
MISCONDUCT
Jeffrey A. Parness*
The topic of regulating attorney conduct most immediately raises
thoughts of disciplinary panels established by court rule or legislative
enactment. Such enforcement mechanisms typically are employed to hear
alleged violations of the American Bar Association's Model Code of
Professional Responsibility or its Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
The code and rules now govern the professional conduct of American
lawyers, whether they work on civil or criminal matters and whether
they work in or out of court. Further reflection on the subject might
also prompt consideration of the conduct of attorneys being questioned
by their former clients, either in a civil malpractice suit or in a setting
in which the legal representation during an earlier criminal case is being
challenged. However, the topic would prompt few to reflect upon the
regulation of lawyers during litigation for conduct which occurs during
that litigation and in which the lawyers are not named as parties, their
licenses are not in jeopardy, and their effective legal assistance under
the Sixth Amendment is not examined.
This relatively new method of regulating lawyers during the litigation
of claims belonging to others merits greater attention. The following
paragraphs are intended to prompt such attention and will concern only
the regulation of attorney conduct during civil litigation in traditional
(and not administrative or other) courts. After reviewing the recent
recognition and expansion of judicial power to regulate an attorney's
conduct during civil litigation, certain difficulties with the exercise of
this new power will be explored. Mainly, these difficulties arise because
courts on occasion simultaneously utilize their new-found authority over
lawyers during litigation to achieve two distinct ends. The more common
goal is to provide redress to opposing parties and others injured by an
attorney's litigation misconduct. The other, less common goal is to
promote societal interests by providing a remedy to the public at large
Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
*

Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University. B.A., Colby College;

J.D., The University of Chicago. This paper is based upon a talk presented on June 14,
1987, at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association.

1306

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 47

for the same, or comparable, activity. While addressing such differing
objectives in the same breath, courts at times deny procedural protections, defy the limits imposed upon their authority, and fail to accord
equal treatment to similarly situated lawyers. This paper will focus on
these two objectives by examining the differences in private interest
sanctions and public interest sanctions imposed during civil litigation.
In doing so, it will also address the relationship between these sanctions
and other forms of attorney regulation.
Before reviewing the nature of the new regulatory power and its
recent expansion into public interest remedies, the similarities between
public interest sanctions during civil litigation and both traditional disciplinary actions and criminal contempt proceedings should first be noted.
In each instance, attorney conduct is scrutinized for the primary purpose
of protecting the public at large. Should it be found that a relevant
standard of conduct has been breached, any resulting remedy would be
geared primarily to promote public, rather than private, interests. Possible remedies include disbarment, suspension, reprimand, admonishment,
a monetary assessment payable to the government (at times, related to
the government's expenses resulting from the breach of conduct) or
referral to a disciplinary panel. Notwithstanding these similarities, there
are significant distinctions in the procedural safeguards afforded attorneys who stand accused of misconduct in each setting. While some
differences are inevitable and necessary, the safeguards attending the
imposition of public interest sanctions during civil litigation have generally been inadequate.
Recent recognition and significant expansion of judicial power to
regulate attorney conduct during civil litigation is best exemplified by
certain of the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and their progeny. The most noteworthy of the 1983 amendments
altered rule 11.' This amendment has received significant professional
support, including endorsement by the American Bar Association's
Stanley Commission on Professionalism, 2 adoption by a growing number of state trial courts,3 and implementation by a number of appellate

1. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 90 F.R.D. 451, 462-63 (1981) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft] (references to this
draft are prompted by its inclusion of a comparison of the old and new rule 11, as well
as the relevant Advisory Committee Notes).
2. ". . . In the Spirit of Public Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer
Professionalism, Report of the Commission on Professionalism to the Board of Governors
and the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, 112 F.R.D.- 243, 291-92
(1986).
3. Ariz. Rule Civ. Proc. 16(lla) (West Supp. 1986); Mont. Rule Civ. Proc. 11
(1985); N.C. Rule Civ. Proc. 11 (West 1959); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 2-611 (West Supp.
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courts. 4 It has even been suggested for use by the United States

Supreme Court.' While the former as well as the current provisions

of rule 11 address judicial regulation of attorney conduct, the new
rule greatly expands not only the conduct regulated, but also the
nature of judicial regulation.
Under the earlier version of rule 11, an attorney signing a document
filed in a district court was deemed to have certified that the paper was
supported by "good ground" and was "not interposed for delay." 6 A
willful violation of this signature requirement, as well as the insertion
of scandalous or indecent matter, permitted the court to subject the
'7
responsible attorney "to appropriate disciplinary action."
Under present rule 11, an attorney signing a document filed in a
district court is deemed to have certified that the paper was founded
on "reasonable inquiry," "well grounded in fact," "warranted by existing law," and "not interposed primarily for any improper purpose." 8
Any violation of the rule, whether willful or not, now requires rather
than permits the court to subject the responsible attorney to "an appropriate sanction. ' 9 Such a sanction may include an order to pay the
opposing party's reasonable attorney's fees, 10 thus encompassing nondisciplinary remedies."1
In amending the signature requirement in 1983, the federal rulemakers expressly recognized the judicial power to employ sanctions
against attorneys during civil litigation to punish, compensate or deter.
1987); Mo. Rules of Court 55.03 (West 1987); Ky. Rule Civ. Proc. 11 (Baldwin 1986);
Mich. Rules of Court 2.114(D) and (E) (West 1987); Minn. Rule Civ. Proc. 11 (West
Supp. 1987); Tenn. Rule Civ. Proc. 11 (Michie 1987).
4. See, e.g., Utah Court Rules 40 (Michie 1987); Rule 3.1 of the Rules of Court
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; In re Disciplinary Action
Curl, 803 F.2d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 1986).
5. S. Estreicher & J. Sexton, Redefining the Supreme Court's Role, 119-120 (Yale
Univ. Press 1986).
6. Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 462.
7. Id.at 463.
8. Id.at 462.
9. Id. at 463.
10. Id. Whether attorney's fees may be awarded against an attorney absent bad
faith or intentional misconduct is uncertain. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions of Power, 11 Hofstra
L. Rev. 997 (1983) (suggesting that rule II must be read in conjunction with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927, which also permits attorney's fees awards against lawyers engaging in litigation
misconduct).
11. Prior to the 1983 amendments, confusion and mischief surrounded the issue of
disciplinary action. Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking"
Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 42-47, 62 (1976).
Frequently, discipline under rule 11 was read not to permit an award of attorney fees.
United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 603 F.2d 100, 103 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979).
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They indicated that the amended rule would encourage the "detection
and punishment" of a violation of the signing requirement. 12 They further
declared that the amendments incorporated "the equitable doctrine permitting the court to award expenses, including attorney's fees, to a
litigant whose opponent acts in bad faith in instituting or conducting
litigation,' ' 3 and that the new requirements stressed "a deterrent orientation in dealing with improper pleading.' ' 4 Such judicial authority
to punish, compensate or deter has been recognized by many trial and
appellate courts. 5
With the present authority to impose a sanction designed to punish
an attorney for litigation misconduct, to compensate those incurring

injuries resulting from such misconduct, or to deter instances of similar

attorney misconduct, trial and appellate courts can now assess both
private interest and public interest sanctions. Recent experience indicates
most courts initially focus only on the private interest sanction of compensation for individual losses, particularly' for attorney's fees,' 6 and this
is how the sanctioning authority should be used. 7 Nevertheless, in certain
cases courts go beyond this private remedy by awarding compensation
for the public's losses or by pursuing discipline against errant lawyers.
In these multi-sanction settings, particularly egregious attorney conduct
is usually involved. 8 Such egregious acts often fall within the zone of
12. Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 461 (Advisory Committee Note on Fed. R.
Civ. P. 7(b)(3)), recognized in id. at 465.
13. Id.at 463.
14. Id. at 465. Courts utilizing rule 11 and its counterparts have recognized that
deterrence can be pursued even though punishment and compensation may not be involved.
For example, individualized warnings have been issued to lawyers involved in misconduct,
and generalized warnings have been issued to all who practice before the court. See, e.g.,
Dreis & Krump Mfg. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 802 F.2d 247, 256 (7th Cir. 1986)
("Lawyers practicing in the Seventh Circuit, take heed!") and National Ass'n of Radiation
Survivors v. Walters, Ill F.R.D. 595, 603 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (future submissions by a
certain lawyer to be treated with due skepticism).
15. But see Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule Il-Some "Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 Geo. L.J. 1313,
1338 (1986) (arguing rule 11 permits only an award of reasonable costs and attorney's
fees to an opposing party and other "less stringent sanctions," and thus does not permit
sanctions which serve as punishment).
16. Id. at 1333 ("In 96 percent of the cases studied in which sanctions were imposed
for violation of rule 11, the courts awarded 'reasonable' costs and attorney fees to the
party opposing the sanctioned paper.").
17. Parness, Groundless Pleadings and Certifying Attorneys in the Federal Courts,
1985 Utah L. Rev. 325, 355.
18. See, e.g., Itel Containers Int'l v. Puerto Rico Marine Mgt., 108 F.R.D. 96, 104
(D.N.J: 1985) (knowing the court lacked jurisdiction, defendant's counsel litigated the
matter as if jurisdiction existed and went out of his way to induce the plaintiff and the
court to believe jurisdiction was proper); Zerman v. Jacobs, 113 F.R.D. 13, 14 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (plaintiff "persisted in a personal vendetta against the defendants aimed at wearing
them down and clogging the courts, despite repeated warnings...").
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activity prohibited by the code or rules of professional conduct administered through bar disciplinary panels,1 9 or within the zone of conduct
proscribed by the statutes on criminal contempt.20
During civil litigation in which both private and public interest
sanctions are imposed for attorney misconduct, significant differences
between the two remedies are frequently unappreciated. Similarly unrecognized on occasion are important differences between the varying
types of public interest sanctions. Finally, in some instances there remain
undiscussed and thus unexplained the differences in the mechanisms
attending sanctions, disciplinary actions, and contempt, all of which may
be available for addressing the same attorney misconduct during civil
litigation. Failure to distinguish properly the distinct remedies and mechanisms available for attorney misconduct during civil litigation prompts
criticism and undermines the sincere and necessary regulatory efforts
under rule 11 and its counterparts. Criticism is appropriate as there have
been troubling instances in which private and public interest sanctions
for litigation misconduct were imposed during civil litigation.
An examination of recent sanction cases is disturbing because there
is often found an inappropriate consolidation of the prosecution, hearing,
and resolution of the two distinct types of sanctions-private interest
remedies and public interest remedies. For example, the pursuit of a
public interest sanction, such as a monetary assessment payable to the
court, is often first noted and then resolved by a court during its ruling
on- a motion for a private interest sanction, such as an award of
attorney's fees to an aggrieved private party. In such cases, the court
effectively serves as a policeman, a prosecutor, and an adjudicator before
the accused learns that any public interest sanctions are even being
contemplated. Occasionally, the court also serves as a witness when, for
example, it recalls earlier cases in which the same lawyer engaged in

19. While rule 11 mandates sanctions on attorneys who sign papers formulated without
reasonable inquiry, not well grounded in fact or not warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, Model Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 (1983) provides: "A lawyer shall not bring or defend
a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis 'for doing
so that is not frivolous, which includes good faith argument for an extension, modification
or reversal of existing law."
20. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1966) ("A court of the United States shall have power to
punish .. . such contempt of its authority, . . . as . . . disobedience or resistance to its
lawful ... rule .... ); 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1966) ("Any person ... willfully disobeying
any lawful .. . rule of any district court of the United States . . . by doing any act or
thing therein, or thereby forbidden, if the act or thing so done be of such character as
to constitute also a criminal offense under any statute of the United States or under the
laws of any State in which the act was committed, shall be prosecuted for such contempt
as provided in section 3691 of this title .. ").See, e.g., Zerman, 113 F.R.D. at 15.
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other acts of misconduct. 21 While a court's assumption of a variety of
roles during the imposition of a public interest sanction certainly serves
worthwhile objectives such as economy, efficiency and speed, such should
not come at the expense of fundamental fairness.
22
Consider the decision in Lyle v. Charlie Brown Flying Club, Inc.
The defendant had on at least two occasions requested sanctions, presumably attorney's fees and costs, against the plaintiff's lawyers pursuant
to rule 11. In response, the court scheduled an evidentiary hearing,
indicating that the hearing would be confined to three issues. The issues
all concerned the activities of the plaintiff's three lawyers prior to and
during the lawsuit.23 After the hearing, the court granted the defendant
an award of attorney's fees. Its decision was founded, in part, on a
determination that two of the plaintiff's lawyers had engaged in a
"flagrant misrepresentation" to the court.2 4 Without further hearing (and
in the apparent absence of much, if any, warning), the court concluded
that an additional sanction against the two lawyers was warranted. It
ordered a "public reprimand" of the lawyers, consisting of a notice,
not less than one eighth of a page, in a major Atlanta daily legal
newspaper. 2 The notice declared that the two lawyers were reprimanded
for having "intentionally misrepresented to the court facts contained in
' 26
the record in the case."
This public interest sanction, arising from a motion for a private
interest sanction, is particularly troubling if the first notice of possible
dual-sanctions comes in the decision on the private party's motion. Such
a lack of notice was recognized in another multiple sanctions case, Advo
System, Inc, v. Walters.27 After granting a- rule 11 motion requesting
that the plaintiff's lawyer pay for the defendant's attorney's fees, the
court further declared that the plaintiff's lawyer would also be held
accountable for "the waste of judicial resources" caused by the pursuit

21. See, e.g., Cheek v. Doe, 110 F.R.D. 420, 422 (N.D. Il. 1986), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, No. 86-2155, slip op. at nn.3 & 4 (7th Cir. June 5, 1987); Becker v. Adams
Drug Co., 819 F.2d 32, 33 (2d Cir. 1987) (pro se plaintiff's numerous frivolous appeals
recalled); United States v. Dominguez, 810 F.2d 128, 129 (7th Cir. 1987).
22. 112 F.R.D. 392 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
23. Id. at 394.
24. Id. at 403.
25. Id.at 403-04.
26. Id.at 4Q4.
27. 110 F.R.D. 426 (E.D. Mich. 1986). See also Dore v. Schultz, 582 F. Supp. 154
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). Lack of notice can also occur in a dual sanctions case involving
misconduct of a party. See e.g., Dominguez v. Figel, 626 F. Supp. 368, 372 and 374
(N.D. Ind. 1986). Cf. Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 570 (3d Cir. 1985)
("as a general practice a monetary detriment should not be imposed by a court without
prior notice and some occasion to respond").
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of "baseless litigation. ' 2 It thereupon assessed $900 against the plaintiff's lawyer (as well as $900 against the plaintiff) to cover a portion
29
of the $3600 cost incurred by the court in holding the unnecessary trial.
Because it found that the plaintiff and his lawyer "were likely unaware
that such a sanction might be imposed," 30 the remainder of the $3600
cost was not assessed. The court concluded by giving notice to all future
litigants that the pursuit to trial of meritless cases would not be tolerated
and that "the cost of such conduct to the public will not be ignored." 3'
Apparently, in future decisions on rule 11 requests for private interest
sanctions, the total governmental cost of holding trial will be assessed
because sufficient notice of this possibility has been given in an earlier
published opinion, albeit in a different case.
Concerns about judicial regulation of attorney conduct during civil
cases also arise when the varying types of public interest sanctions are
not themselves adequately distinguished. For example, courts sometimes
consider simultaneously several such sanctions under the apparent assumption that their pursuit, hearing and resolution are governed by
similar legal constraints. A monetary assessment payable to the court
and related to the court's expenses in incurring an attorney's misconduct
seems very different from an assessment which is unrelated to such
expenses. Orders of compensation typically require differing procedural
safeguards than orders of punishment.3 2 Further, trouble develops when
a court fails to explain the basis of a public interest sanction. For
example, courts often order attorneys, as a result of their misconduct,
to make a monetary payment to the clerk of the court without articulating
how the amount was determined. 33 Judicial review is impossible and

28. Advo System, Inc., 110 F.R.D. at 433.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 568 (3d Cir. 1985) (while affirming
a trial judge's inherent authority to assess against an attorney the cost of impanelling a
jury, the court reserved the issue of monetary sanctions wholly unrelated to any costs
incurred). Compare Doyle v. United States, 817 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1987) (failing
to distinguish compensatory and other money sanctions). In comparable settings, compensatory contempt proceedings differ in procedure from criminal contempt proceedings,
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 795 F.2d 226, 234 (1st Cir. 1986), and compensatory and
disciplinary remedies are handled differently by appellate courts, Toepfer v. Dep't. of
Transp., 792 F.2d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
33. Dore v. Schultz, 582 F. Supp. 154, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Pravic v. United States
Industries-Clearing, 109 F.R.D. 620, 524 (E.D. Mich. 1986); Young v. I.R.S., 596 F.
Supp. 141, 152 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Home-Pack Transport, Inc. v. Donovan, 102 F.R.D.
163, 166 (D. Md. 1984); Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 360 (5th
Cir. 1986); McDougal v. C.I.R., 818 F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Stillwell, 810 F.2d 135, 136 (7th Cir. 1987). But see Cheek v. Doe, No. 86-2155 (7th
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appellate court deference to lower court determinations invites lower
court action without standards or in derogation of any standards.
Finally, difficulty has arisen regarding the overlap of the regulatory
mechanisms designed to address similar attorney misconduct. For example, federal courts occasionally rule that the procedures for assessing
monetary awards payable to the court should be similar whether assessment occurs under rule 11 or pursuant to a prosecution for criminal'
contempt.3 4 While the quest for equal treatment is commendable, such
rulings are flawed in that they fail to appreciate that some public interest
sanctions under rule 11 serve to compensate or to deter, but not to
punish," while sanctions for criminal contempt are typically solely penal
in nature.3 6 The procedures attending punishment need to be far more
stringent. Similarly, courts appear to differ on whether provisions like
rule 11 permit, as a form of "appropriate sanction," restrictions on
the attorney's continuing ability to practice law or whether separate
37
disciplinary proceedings are needed.
Besides the display of insensitivity to the differences in remedies
and regulatory mechanisms, the imposition on attorneys of public interest

Cir. June 5, 1987) (in reducing the assessment payable to the court, concern was expressed
for "lack of reasons"); Eash, 757 F.2d at 571 (written findings are appropriate). See also
Hyde v. Van Wormer, 106 S. Ct. 403 (1985) (while six justices awarded $500 in damages
to party opposing frivolous petition for certiorari, three dissenting justices note lack of
explanation); Yagman v. Baden, 796 F.2d 1165, 1184 (9th Cir. 1986) ("round-figure"
approach to sanctions is inadequate, as award must be undertaken with some precision
and properly itemized in terms of perceived misconduct and the sanctioning authority),
modified, 803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1986); Raymond Lloyd Co. v. Dist. Ct. 20th Jud.
Dist., 732 P.2d 612, 616 (Colo. 1987) (inflexible, mandatory fine under court rule is
void).
34. Donaldson v. Clark, 786 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir. 1986) and Cotner v. Hopkins,
795 F.2d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1986) (both courts assumed monetary payments to the court
constitute punishment). Cf. Eash, 757 F.2d at 568; Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551
(en banc court reverses three judge panel's decision and finds criminal contempt procedures
are not always needed for monetary sanctions payable to the court). While I have
distinguished compensatory and other monetary awards payable to the court for due
process purposes, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals apparently distinguishes monetary
awards to the court by whether or not they are related to the misconduct, that is,
commensurate with the willfulness and gravity of the misconduct. Donaldson, 819 F.2d
at 1558, relying on Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1210 (11th
Cir. 1985).
35. See supra notes 12-14.
36. But see 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1966) (criminal contempt proceedings may result in a
"fine" paid to the complainant or other party injured by the act constituting the contempt).
37. Compare Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (after
granting fees and costs under rule 11, the court ordered attorneys to show cause why
they should not be suspended from practice in the court) with Piazza v. Carson City,
652 F. Supp. 1394, 1395 (D. Nev. 1987) (rule 11 does not contemplate disbarment from
practice as an "appropriate sanction").
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sanctions during civil litigation also frequently raises serious equal treatment, delegation of powers, and jury trial questions. These issues must
soon be addressed so that public interest sanctions during civil litigation
can continue to develop as an effective means of regulating attorney
conduct.
The equal treatment issue is well demonstrated by review of a few
recent cases involving compensatory assessments payable to the court.
These cases demonstrate that, besides the inequality caused by differences
about the availability of such sanctions,3 8 inequality also exists where
courts agree that some form of sanction is available. In two recent
cases, an attorney was ordered to pay money to the court to help defray
some, but not all, of the operational costs resulting from the misconduct.3 9 Each court calculated its total costs on the basis of the rate of
$600 per single hour spent by the federal judge. 40 In one case, the court
discounted the total cost by one-half 4' and in another case, the court
ordered the attorney to pay only $500, although the total cost was "in
the neighborhood of $15,000.00."42 Finally, one case, although involving

a sanction against a misconducting party rather than a lawyer, resulted
in a $10,000 assessment where the total cost to the taxpayers was
$24,000. 4 1 In none of the cases was there an adequate explanation of

the factors guiding the court in determining the amount.

This absence of an explanation is not so surprising given that most
rules and statutes which authorize public interest sanctions are themselves
without standards. For example, rule 11 states only that "an appropriate
sanction" must be imposed and provides for reasonable expenses of
other parties as the sole illustration of such a sanction. The rule thus
delegates very significant executive and legislative responsibilities to federal judges. They must decide how to uncover additional information
relevant to public interest sanctions" and when to pursue such sanctions.

38.

Kassin, An Empirical Study of Rule 11 San&tions 39-41 (Federal Judicial Center

1985) (survey of judges reveals differences regarding availability of sanctions other than
attorney's fees); Nelken, supra note 15, at 1338 (disagreement on availability of punitive

sanctions).
39.

Advo System, Inc. v. Walters, 110 F.R.D. 426, 533 (E.D. Mich. 1986), and

41.
42.

Advo System, Inc., 110 F.R.D. at 433.
Edwards, 644 F. Supp. at 1573.

Edwards v. Marsh, 644 F. Supp. 1564, 1573 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
40. Advo System, Inc., 110 F.R.D. at 433, and Edwards, 644 F. Supp. at 1573 n.5.
43.

Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.R.D. 57, 67 (E.D. Mich. 1987). See also

Dominguez v. Figel, 626 F. Supp. 368, 374 (N.D. Ind. 1986) ($1500 assessment when
cost was $3400).
44. Under rule 11, a court is obligated "upon its own initiative" to impose "an
appropriate sanction." Often, the sanction of an opposing party's expenses, by itself, is
inappropriate as the amount may be quite small in comparison to the misconduct. The
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Also, they must decide what sanctions are permitted under the rule as
well as the requirements for each. These significant delegations of non45
adjudicatory functions raise troubling separation of powers concerns
and heighten the opportunity for unequal treatment and abuse of discretion.
The jury trial issue is both legally perplexing and very important.
In April, 1987, the United States Supreme Court recognized a jury trial
right, on the liability issue, in instances where the government seeks to
impose a non-compensatory civil remedy of up to $10,000 a day upon
46
anyone violating legislative and regulatory guidelines on water pollution.
The ramifications of this decision on the processes for imposing public
interest sanctions during civil litigation are uncertain. Jury trials must
now be considered at least for orders commanding monetary payments
to the court which are unrelated to the court's expenses. Of course,
recognition of a jury trial right would severely burden a court's authority
regarding certain public interest sanctions. The federal rulemakers who
proposed rule 11 were quite concerned with such burdens and declared
that any gains achieved under the new rule must not be allowed to be
"offset by the cost of satellite litigation over the imposition of sanctions.'

47

factual inquiry for any private interest sanction, typically an opposing party's expenses,
may not itself prompt a full understanding of all attorney misconduct. The inquiry initiated
by a private party may end once sufficient misconduct is established to warrant the private
remedy, although further inquiry could reveal more reprehensible conduct warranting
additional public interest sanctions.
45., Regarding delegation of executive authority to individual courts, consider the
following statement in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 55 U.S.L.W.
4676, 4685 (U.S. May 26, 1987) (Scalia, J., concurring):
The judicial power is the power to decide, in accordance with law, who should
prevail in a case or controversy. . . . That includes the power to serve as a
neutral adjudicator in a criminal case, but does not include the power to seek
out law violators in order to punish them which would be quite incompatible
with the task of neutral adjudication. It is accordingly well established that the
judicial power does not generally include the power to prosecute crimes. ...
Rather, since the prosecution of law violators is part of the implementation of
the laws, it is-at least to the extent that it is publicly exercised-executive power,
vested by the Constitution in the President. (citations omitted).
Regarding delegation of legislative authority to individual courts, relevant factors in
considering the propriety of permitting ad hoc judgments about "appropriate" sanctions
include the lawmakers' declarations of policy (for the federal rules they are found in the
Advisory Committee Notes), their declarations of standards to guide judicial action, and
whether the lawmakers required any judicial findings during the exercise of legislative
authority. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
46. Tull v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987). See also Rife v. Godbehere, 814
F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987) (possible fine of $500 for an individual triggers a jury trial right
in a misdemeanor case).
47. Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 466.
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Given the significant difficulties encountered with the judicial imposition of public interest sanctions on attorneys during civil litigation,
can the continued exercise of such power be justified? Notwithstanding
reasonable concerns, support can be justified by the compelling need
for occasional public interest sanctions and by the opportunity to minimize future difficulties.
In the absence of public interest sanctions against attorneys during
civil litigation, regulatory enforcement tools would include only private
interest sanctions during litigation, proceedings before disciplinary panels,
criminal contempt actions, and attorney malpractice suits. These other
devices, while useful in the regulation of attorney conduct during litigation, are by themselves inadequate. Although private interest sanctions
related to attorney's fees and other litigation costs can be handled quickly
and cheaply, alone they often constitute an incomplete remedy. Many
losses will go unrecovered; 4s more importantly, these sanctions are at
times an ineffective deterrent in that the expenses are low relative to
49
the benefits derived from the sanctioned behavior.
Similarly, private interest sanctions cannot truly serve to punish,
though they may be viewed by those sanctioned as punishment. While
traditional disciplinary and criminal contempt proceedings may involve
punishment, as well as forms of deterrence and compensation not now
available through private interest sanctions, such actions are slow, pertain
to more limited kinds of attorney misconduct than are encompassed
within rule 11-type provisions, and require independent case filings such
that the attorney misconduct is distanced from the litigation in which
it occurred. Requirements such as privity,50 as well as many of the
problems attending disciplinary actions and criminal contempt prosecutions, serve to limit the utility of attorney malpractice suits.
By contrast, public interest sanctions are quick, in that they can be
imposed summarily, are efficient, in that they are considered by the
48. Not only are the public's losses uncompensated, but also certain private losses
go uncompensated with private interest sanctions. For the view that recoveries under
private interest sanctions should be broadened to encompass all pecuniary losses, see
Roberts v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 422 Mich. 594, 374 N.W.2d 905, 924 (1985) (Levin,
J., separate opinion).
49. See, e.g., Nelken, supra note 15, at 1325 (noting that sanctioned lawyers can
benefit from the imposition of sanctions, as they may become known as certified hardnosed litigators); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Illinois, 113 F.R.D. 637, 644
n.16 (N.D. I11. 1987) ("With deep-pocket litigants ... there is a serious question whether
adding some deductible expenses to their total cost-and only when they are caught-provides
enough of a disincentive to such improper conduct.").
50. See, e.g., Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981). See also
Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 630 P.2d 840 (1981) (an intentional
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility does not trigger attorney civil liability
for all injuries).
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very same court in which the relevant attorney conduct occurred, are
flexible, in that they can serve to compensate, punish, or deter, and
are gapfilling, in that they address misconduct which demands more
than an award of a private interest sanction, less than a designation as
a crime, and something other than a full-scale hearing at which a
professional license may be removed or restricted.
The 'issue, then, is how to impose public interest sanctions without
the resulting aforementioned difficulties. One answer is that over time,
as solutions are found to problems on a case-by-case basis, the difficulties
will diminish. Such a response is unsatisfactory, however, as it fails to
take into account the ways in which public interest sanctions against
lawyers during civil litigation can be made more effective without awaiting the arrival of new cases.
In conclusion, several additional suggestions on improving the processes for public interest sanctions will be offered. First, the availability
of public interest sanctions under rule 11-type provisions should be
generally recognized. Reasonable arguments are heard against such a
recognition,"' but should be found unpersuasive given the important void
in attorney regulation which is filled by this form of sanctioning authority. In the absence of express authorization within a rule 11-type
provision, public interest sanctions should be explicitly recognized in
local court rules and judicial opinions. Local court rules are especially
important, as they can address not only the availability of, but also the
procedures and standards for public interest sanctions. In speaking about
local court rules which provide for assessments against attorneys of
certain expenses incurred by a court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit recently said:
The local rule device fulfills important informational purposes,
placing the bar on notice of a court's policies . . . Similarly a
local rule may well be the most effective means of ensuring that
all members of the bar are aware that a particular practice is
deemed improper, and thus subject to a sanction. Local rules
may also alert rulemakers to the need for changes in national
rules and supply an empirical basis for making such changes.
Furthermore, a local rule may be a powerful implement for
rationalizing diverse court practices and imposing uniformity
52
within a given district.

51. Nelken, supra note 15 (concern for the chilling effect on vigorous advocacy);
Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 Harv. L.
Rev. 630 (1987) (concern for deterring undeveloped and nonstandard claims).
52. Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 570 (3d Cir. 1985). The court
proceeded to declare that "fundamental fairness may require some measure of prior notice
to an attorney that the conduct . . . is subject to discipline or sanction .... " Id. at 571.
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A second suggestion is that the relationship between private and
public interest sanctions should be clarified. The differences in the two
forms of sanctions must be recognized, as should the distinctions between
the varying types of public interest sanctions. Such differences and
distinctions demand varying procedural safeguards, depending upon which
sanction is being considered. For example, judges do not undertake the
varying executive, legislative and judicial roles when considering private
interest sanctions as they do when public interest sanctions are being
considered. In addition, all monetary assessments made payable to the
court should not be considered the same, for there exist valid distinctions,
such as between punitive and compensatory orders. As between private
and public interest sanctions, priority should be given to compensating
private persons.53 Thus, money orders which serve the public interest in
deterrence are generally appropriate only when compensation to injured
private persons constitutes an insufficient monetary award because the
attorney's misconduct is especially reprehensible.
Third, further examination is needed as to the relationship between
public interest sanctions against lawyers under rule 11-type provisions
and other actions against lawyers such as traditional disciplinary proceedings, criminal contempt prosecutions and civil suits. Warranting
review are questions such as: Under what circumstances should a civil
court refer the record in a rule 11-type proceeding to the inquiry board
or officer within the bar disciplinary mechanism? Under what circumstances (per double jeopardy and otherwise) might a rule 11-type proceeding bar a later criminal contempt prosecution? To what extent should
courts considering public interest sanctions take into account the possibility that certain private losses, unrecoverable as part of a private
'interest sanction, may be pursued in a later civil suit? Finally, what
role should the record in a rule 11-type proceeding play in any later
disciplinary or criminal contempt action?
Public interest sanctions under provisions like rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are fast becoming an important component of
the attorney regulatory system. Although difficulties inhere in their use,
their employment should be continued. While doing so, courts should
explicitly differentiate between public and private interest sanctions, provide fairer procedures during the consideration of public interest sanctions, and coordinate any public interest sanctions with disciplinary,
criminal contempt, and other civil remedies.

53. Parness, supra note 17, at 355-56. The extent of any such compensation is,
however, debatable. See supra note 48.

